25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030029-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000200030029-2 Top Secret Approved For F aserl BlWBg(Q 102700200030029-2 82 ALERT MEMORANDUM Copy 5 January 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council Attached for your information is an alert memorandum on China-Vietnam. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/( /$8SedF*- DP83B01027 000200030029-2 Top Secret 25X1 Approved For Rase 2007/02/08 : 027F0200030029-2 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers I Copy 5 January 1979 ALERT MEMORANDUM Beijing's inability to forestall the Vietnamese invasion amounts to a major setback to Chinese prestige and security in- terests. The Chinese likely feel compelled to demonstrate in some tangible way their determination to resist any further ex- pansion of Vietnamese "hegemony" and shore up China's credibil- ity as an Asian power. To this end the Chinese are preparing to support resistance forces based in the western half of Kam- puchea and hope to embroil Vietnam in a costly and protracted military involvement in Kampuchea. II Approved For Release 2007/O2VOO :nkW> D 83B01027R00 200030029-2 25X1 25X1 Top Secret Approved For l ase 2007/02/08 : bl027F 0200030029-2 In considering their next move, the Chinese must weigh the political and economic costs of a protracted military con- flict with Vietnam. The Chinese may choose to engineer a strong localized demonstration of Chinese power along the fron- tier--perhaps the temporary occupation of disputed territory as they did in India in 1962. But we cannot rule out more force- ful action such as Chinese airstrikes deeper into the country. Nor can we rule out miscalculation that could lead to a level of conflict both sides would prefer to avoid. II If the Chinese escalate the level of hostilities, we would expect Moscow to respond first by conspicuously stepping up its military aid to Vietnam, by making a naval show of force off the coast of Vietnam, perhaps even a port visit, and by holding high-level consultations under Article Six of the recently con- cluded Friendship Treaty. If none of the above appeared to be deterring the Chinese, the Soviets might then begin a campaign of intimidation along the Sino-Soviet border--including demon- strative military air and ground patrolling, military maneuvers and ultimately, some sort of limited military provocation. u Top Sec,- -st 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RLP83BO102 000200030029-2

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